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Most everyone will allow that our visual experiences can be misleading to varying degrees regarding the colors of things.  For example, when confronted with color-matching tasks under suboptimal viewing conditions, subjects are often mistaken about which sample matches the target in its surface color.  We get to a matter of controversy when we ask whether color experiences sometimes also misrepresent.  One familiar view on the matter is that color illusion is fundamentally a failure of veridicality.  On this way of thinking, color experiences have a nature similar to judgments about color: they are essentially representational.  Color experiences are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate.  Color illusions are experiences with inaccurate contents.  They are misrepresentations of the colors of things.  (Throughout I reserve the term “representation” for psychological-state kinds that are, by their nature, susceptible to error.)  Another possibility is that color illusion involves a different sort of mismatch: not a discrepancy between representation and reality, but a divergence from correct performance on relevant color-matching tasks.   Some viewing conditions affect how colors look without compromising performance on matching tasks; other viewing conditions alter color appearance in ways that negatively impact performance.  Viewing conditions of the latter sort give rise to experiences which systematically mislead, but any misrepresentation of color exists at the level of judgment and not at the sensory level.
	The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences represent, color illusions misrepresent.  In what follows I offer an argument against this view.  My starting point is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception.  After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things.  I consider various ways of trying to avoid the objection, and find all of the responses wanting.  My conclusion is that we have reason to be skeptical of the orthodox view that color experiences are constitutively representational.​[1]​

I
The view of color perception I recommend in this paper is a variation on a view defended by Shoemaker, who endorses the following pair of claims:
Existential Thesis.  There are color-related items distinct from surface colors,​[2]​ often referred to as apparent colors or color appearances.
Psychological Thesis.  Visual experience represents surface colors indirectly, by way of these color appearances.
In this section I hope to accomplish two things.  First, I hope to bolster one of Shoemaker’s arguments for the Existential Thesis.  Second, I aim to show that reflection on the Existential Thesis raises a serious worry about the Psychological Thesis.  The worry is that the Existential Thesis cannot be reconciled with the assumption that color experience represents surface colors.  Later in the paper I propose a revised version of the Psychological Thesis that does away with this assumption.
One of Shoemaker’s arguments for the existence of color appearances depends on the controversial claim that spectrum inversion is conceivable.​[3]​  Another argument depends on the uncontroversial claim that viewing conditions affect how the colors of things look.  My focus here is on the latter style of argument.  That viewing conditions influence color appearance becomes perspicuous if you attend in the right way to changes in lighting conditions.  Variations in illumination can have noticeable effects on how things look and they can do so even in cases where your perception of surface color remains constant, cases like the following described by Christopher Peacocke:
Imagine you are in a room looking at a corner formed by two of its walls.  The walls are covered with paper of a uniform hue, brightness and saturation.  But one wall is more brightly illuminated than the other.  In these circumstances, your experience can represent both walls as being the same color: it does not look to you as if one of the walls is painted with brighter paint than the other.  Yet it is equally an aspect of your visual experience itself that the region of the visual field in which one wall is presented is brighter than that in which the other is presented. 
(1983, pp. 12-13)
What Peacocke is describing here is an instance of lightness constancy, which we can preliminarily characterize as stability in perception of surface color in spite of variation in luminance—the amount or intensity of the light reflected to the eyes—brought on by differences in degree of illumination, e.g. by cast shadows or by variations in object shape and orientation that give rise to attached shadows, as in the following example due to Husserl: “Here it is enough to point to the readily grasped difference between the red of this ball, objectively seen as uniform, and the indubitable indeed necessary shading of the subjective color sensations.”​[4]​
	As Shoemaker notes, shadows not only make things perceived to be the same in surface color look different; they also make things perceived to be different in surface color look the same.  He offers the following illustration:
And, supposing that the table is brown, the way the shadowed part looks may be the same as the way an unshadowed surface in another part of the room looks, where the latter is of a darker shade of brown than the table surface; and this can be so even though the two surfaces do not look to have the same shade of color. 
(2006, pp. 461-2)
Shadows, it seems, can affect how similar two items look without altering what surface colors things look to have.
	When we attend to these color-related similarities and differences in how things look due to variations in illumination, we are evidently attending to something other than similarities and differences in surface color.  In a verbal echo of Thomas Reid (1997, p. 87), Shoemaker remarks that these similarities and differences to which we are attending “have no names” (2006, p. 462).  Like reflection on the possibility of spectrum inversion,​[5]​ introspection on the noticeable effects that variations in illumination have on color experience seems to demand that we expand our ontology.​[6]​
	Like Peacocke, Shoemaker focuses on variations in intensity of illumination rather than variations in the spectral composition of the illuminant.  His emphasis on changes in intensity across scenes makes sense in this context because we are especially good at detecting them.  By contrast, our ability to detect chromatic changes in the illuminant is relatively poor (Almeida and Nascimento 2009).​[7]​  Accordingly, I will refer to Shoemaker’s argument as the argument from lightness constancy (rather than the argument from color constancy).  The argument begins with a premise established via introspection:
1. Lightness constancy regularly involves non-illusory, color-related items that alter as our perception of surface color remains stable, items which are apt to change with noticeable changes in illumination.
2. Surface colors are not apt to change with such changes in illumination.
Hence,
3.  There are non-illusory, color-related items distinct from surface colors.
Shoemaker supposes that we have no names for these items in our everyday talk about colors.  Whether he is right on this matter is a question I will set aside.​[8]​  What is important for our purposes is the alleged discovery of color-related items additional to surface colors, items we will refer to as color appearances.
	While the premises of the argument from lightness constancy are difficult to deny, it is doubtful that the argument, at least as sketched above, delivers a conclusion of any consequence.  Because we enjoy lightness constancy, our perception of an object’s surface color can remain stable through a variety of changes in the degree to which the object is illuminated.  Katz’s (1935) groundbreaking work on lightness perception​[9]​ generated a widespread appreciation of the fact that this feature of objects—degree of illumination​[10]​—is a visible property distinct from surface color.  We regularly see shadows, specular highlights, spotlights, diffuse interreflections, and other variations in illumination within a scene.​[11]​  Why think that introspection on lightness constancy reveals anything more than these mundane differences in degree of illumination?
	This type of deflationary response to the argument from lightness constancy is familiar.  Commenting on Peacocke’s original example, Alex Byrne (2001, p. 22) writes: “…in the two walls case, it visually appears to the subject that he’s facing two adjoining walls, the same in color but one more brightly illuminated than the other.”  And Michael Tye has recently endorsed the same type of response to Peacocke’s example:
As for the example of the room whose walls look white and yet still look different, my account of this is straightforward.  The walls all look white to me but they look illuminated to different degrees.  Color experiences represent not only color but also level of illumination... 
(2006, p. 172)
Meanwhile Schellenberg (2008) has brought this general approach to bear directly on Shoemaker’s argument from lightness constancy.  She introduces the term “situation-dependent properties” to refer to properties fixed by an object’s intrinsic properties (e.g. shape and color) together with its situational features (e.g. lighting conditions and orientation).  Schellenberg asks why we should think of the noticeable differences through changes in lighting conditions or position as anything more than changes in the degree to which surface areas are illuminated—a situation-dependent property of objects.  No expansion of our ontology is necessary here; an addition to our terminology will suffice.
	Schellenberg’s response to Shoemaker is plausible if we focus on the argument from lightness constancy as I formulated it above.  I want to suggest, however, that Shoemaker’s considerations in favor of the Existential Thesis are more subtle than they first appear.  When Shoemaker talks about how viewing conditions affect color appearance, he does not focus just on lighting conditions.  He emphasizes that the same kind of effects on color appearance can be induced by changing the colors surrounding the target object (2006, p. 462).  The significance of this further point will emerge gradually.  But first some general remarks on human lightness perception, our ability to perceive the various achromatic colors of objects (the various shades of gray from white to black) and the degree to which objects are illuminated.  
	Our ability to perceive these distal features (achromatic reflectance and illumination) is remarkable given how paltry the data are.  The proximal stimulus deriving from a given surface—the luminance value of the light reflected from that surface—is highly ambiguous: luminance values conflate the contributions of illumination and reflectance.  Indeed, any given luminance value can yield perception of any shade of gray from white to black, if we skillfully alter the context (Wallach 1948).  How, then, does the human visual system regularly afford perception of surface color?  Given the ambiguity of luminance information, the visual system has to make use of information about the local and global contexts of any given luminance value.  The character of the computations involved is still a matter of dispute, but there is broad agreement that the visual system exploits relative luminance values across the scene.  This idea that the visual system relies on luminance ratios is highly intuitive: luminance ratios, like surface colors, remain stable through changes in the level of illumination.  
	The visual system’s reliance on luminance ratios is significant in part because recognition of this reliance led to the discovery of a further form of lightness constancy.  So far we have been speaking of lightness constancy as stability in perception of surface color through variations in luminance due to differences in degree of illumination, but there are powerful reasons to acknowledge yet another kind of lightness constancy.  On the assumption that perception of achromatic surface color depends on encoding luminance ratios, the visual system is confronted with a further problem of maintaining stability in perception of surface color: not only does the system have to contend with changes in illumination; it also has to deal with changes in background colors which affect luminance ratios.  Experimental work strongly suggests that the visual system copes with the latter problem no less effectively than the former: background-independent constancy is no less robust than illumination-independent constancy (Arend and Spehar 1993).  Today there is widespread agreement that both kinds of constancy are central components of the lightness perception humans enjoy.​[12]​
	When we say that the human visual system enjoys background-independent lightness constancy, we are not saying that background colors have no effect on color appearance.  Background colors, like shadows, routinely affect saturation, hue, and lightness.  Sometimes constancy breaks down and we are confronted with what are called simultaneous contrast illusions, but many changes in color appearance due to contrast do not upset our capacity to make reflectance matches.  Further, contrast effects are no more abnormal, statistically speaking, than the effects of shadows.  (Think of the lightening effect that a reduction tube has in looking at the brown, grey, or olive green surfaces that are everywhere around us.)  Surrounding colors and shadows both have pervasive effects on how the colors of things look and they commonly have these effects without making things look to be other than they are with respect to surface color.  The pervasive influence background colors have on color appearance is easy to overlook because our attention is usually focused on invariant properties like surface color and shape, features which afford object identification and reidentification.  As with subtle differences in shading, one often needs something like the attentiveness of the visual artist to isolate the impact surrounding colors have on color appearance.
	An important point has emerged from these brief remarks on the two forms of lightness constancy: human lightness constancy in both of its forms routinely involves stability in perception of surface color through changes in appearance just like those due to changes in surface color (i.e. changes in hue, saturation, and lightness).  Variations in surface color, degree of illumination, and background color all routinely have the same kind of impact on how things look color-wise.  Their respective contributions to what we are calling color appearance are not kept separate; rather, they get lost in the mix.  The upshot is that we need to distinguish color appearance from the other, more familiar kinds that figure in psychological accounts of lightness constancy: the proximal and distal stimuli for color vision and perceptions of the distal stimuli.
	That color appearance is something additional to these familiar kinds is evident once we take note of the distinctive modal or dispositional status of color appearance.  Color appearance is something that is apt to change with a change in surface color and with a change in illumination and with a change in surrounding colors.  This is enough to distinguish color appearance from the distal stimuli for color vision, i.e. surface color and illumination: surface color is not apt to change with a change in illumination or surrounding color; illumination is not apt to change with a change in surface color or surrounding color.  Likewise, color appearance is distinct from perceptions of these distal stimuli: perception of surface color very often remains constant through changes in illumination and surrounding color; perception of illumination very often remains constant through changes in surface color and surrounding color.  Further, we have picked out something distinct from the proximal stimulus for lightness perception, namely, the luminance of the light which reaches the eye.  The luminance of the light coming from a surface area does not alter with a change in surrounding surface colors.​[13]​  We evidently have reason to expand our ontology.​[14]​
	These remarks on lightness constancy help bring out the force of Shoemaker’s attempt to call attention to color appearances.  Several passages suggest that our initial formulation of Shoemaker’s argument from lightness constancy above is incomplete.  Consider the following:
Where the ways things of a certain color look are different in different circumstances, or where things of the different colors look the same in certain circumstances, it may in some cases be right to say that in some of the circumstances an object looks to have a color it doesn’t have; and this would allow the way it looks to be a color it is represented (correctly or incorrectly) as having.  But this will not normally be true in the case of shadowed and unshadowed objects, and it will not always be true in cases involving simultaneous or successive contrast.
(2006, p. 462)
Sometimes a difference in color appearance with a change in circumstances just amounts to a difference in what surface color is perceived.  However, color appearance does not come to the same thing as perception of surface color.  Perception of surface color can remain constant and veridical through changes in color appearance.  Clearly, the latter changes are not just changes in the lighting: they can also arise due to changes in surrounding colors.  Accordingly, Shoemaker’s reasoning in favor of color appearances cannot be dismissed simply by noting that we perceive degree of illumination as well as surface color.
	Our initial formulation of the argument from lightness constancy was flawed.  The Existential Thesis is intended to expand our ontology; it is not supposed to reduce to the obvious truth that degrees of illumination are visible.  The following reformulation of the argument addresses this worry:
1. Human lightness constancy in both of its forms routinely involves stability in perception of surface color through changes in appearance just like those due to changes in surface color (i.e. changes in hue, saturation, and lightness).  Accordingly, lightness constancy regularly involves non-illusory, color-related items which are apt to change with a change in surface color and with a change in illumination and with a change in surrounding colors.
2. The other, more familiar items that figure in psychological accounts of lightness constancy—things like stimuli for color vision and perceptions of these stimuli—are not similarly disposed to change.
Hence,
3. There are non-illusory, color-related items which are distinct from the other, more familiar kinds that figure in psychological accounts of lightness constancy.
The all-important first premise captures the idea that surface color, illumination, and background make the same kind of contribution to how things look color-wise, that their respective contributions get “lost in the mix.”  Once this premise is granted, it is difficult to resist the conclusion.
Now that we have a grasp of his reasoning in favor of color appearances, we are in a position to understand one of Shoemaker’s more striking claims about these items.  In his argument Shoemaker is assuming that a difference in color appearance within a scene sometimes constitutes a representation of a difference in surface color.  And since color appearances are visible items distinct from surface colors, it would seem that color appearances are mediating perception of surface color.  Shoemaker explicitly embraces this way of thinking about color appearances when he tells us that “we perceive colors by perceiving properties distinct from them” (2006, p. 467).	
	This idea that color appearances mediate our awareness of surface colors is somewhat obscure.  An analogy might help to clarify the idea.  Shoemaker is presumably thinking of color appearance as much like paint in what it can represent.  The same type of pigment can, in the very same painting, be used to depict two different surface colors.  It can depict two different surface colors because it can simultaneously do the work of depicting degree of illumination.  And two distinct pigments can be used to depict the very same surface color when they are simultaneously doing the work of depicting degree of illumination.  Likewise, the very same color appearance can serve to represent two different surface colors, and two different color appearances can serve to represent the very same surface color.  Color appearances can do these things because they have the double duty of representing degree of illumination.  On this way of thinking, color appearance mediates our awareness of visually represented surface properties in much the way that paint mediates our awareness of the items depicted by a painting.  We are visually aware of the items depicted by a picture in virtue of our awareness of the paint.  Likewise, visual awareness of surface color and degree of illumination is mediated by awareness of color appearance.  In each case awareness of the mediator is partly constitutive of awareness of the represented items.
	This paint analogy may also help to clarify the sense in which color appearances are non-illusory items.  As a depiction of a scene, a painting can misinform or misrepresent.  What it can misrepresent is the scene depicted.  The painting of the scene cannot misinform regarding the medium (the paint): it reports via the medium; it does not inform or report about the medium.  Arend et al. (1991) offer a similar take on color appearance, recommending we think of color appearance as “perceptually unasserted.”  That is, color appearances are not visually attributed to the objects seen (or anything else).  Normally someone captivated by the use of trompe-l'œil techniques in a painting can shift visual attention from the objects and properties depicted by the painting to the paint itself.  When one focuses on the paint itself, one does not usually see the paint as belonging to the objects represented by the picture.  Arend et al. are supposing that the artist’s mode of attending required to bring color appearances to light is similar: it reveals items not visually predicated of anything in the scene before the eyes.
	Shoemaker has a subtly different position.  On phenomenological grounds, he prefers to think of color appearances as visually attributed to objects.  However, the attribution in question is uninformative and infallible.  To the extent that we are able to make color appearance a distinct object of attention—distinct, that is, from surface color and illumination—at most we learn that the object is disposed to look a certain way.  At best we discover what Shoemaker calls an appearance property of the object seen.​[15]​  If color experience were only to attribute color appearances to objects, it would not be susceptible to error and so would not count as representational in our sense.
In claiming that color experience attributes color appearances to objects, Shoemaker is not suggesting that we see color appearances instead of surface colors.  Rather, his suggestion is that experience attributes both color appearances and surface colors to objects (2006, p. 467).  But unlike attribution of color appearances, attribution of surface colors is supposed to be informative.  Inaccuracy is possible.  For example, when there are misleading cues regarding illumination, experience can misrepresent a shadow as a difference in surface color (2006, p. 462).  Color experience can misclassify.  And when it does, we are confronted with illusion understood as misrepresentation.
Shoemaker’s acknowledgement of this sort of misrepresentation is well motivated.  It would surely be a mistake to think of achromatic color vision as discounting the illuminant.  Discounting the illuminant would result in loss of shading information that plays an essential role in perceiving object boundaries and form.  Achromatic color vision would seem to be as much about illumination perception as perception of surface color.  A natural view to take, then, is that achromatic color perception has the task of registering and classifying luminance edges and gradients.  That is, color vision is in the business of distinguishing edges or gradients due to a difference in surface color from those due to a difference in illumination.  If color vision were silent about how such edges and gradients are to be classified, it would ipso facto be silent about achromatic surface color.  But once we allow that color vision classifies edges and gradients, we must acknowledge the possibility of misrepresentation.  For example, color experience might misrepresent a difference in illumination as a difference in surface color.
	There is, however, a difficulty in making sense of this idea that color experience succeeds in representing reflectance edges and gradients as such, thereby distinguishing them from illumination edges and gradients.  How is color experience managing to encode this difference if it is representing both types of edges and gradients via the very same sorts of differences in color appearance?  How can we hold both that the two types of edges and gradients are encoded in the same way (via the same kinds of differences in color appearance) and that visual experience differentiates them?  The issue is not whether the visual system has regular access to cues that can help to reduce stimulus ambiguity.  I am assuming that there are such cues and that their presence systematically impacts color appearance—especially lightness.​[16]​  The problem is that all such effects on appearance would seem, once again, to get lost in the mix.  Representational output captured solely along the dimensions of hue, saturation, and lightness will remain compatible both with a difference in surface color and with a difference in illumination.  Content encoded in this way is not suited to exclude either possibility (i.e. the possibility that the difference in question is a reflectance edge/gradient vs. the possibility that it is an illumination edge/gradient).  How, then, will content encoded in this way manage to represent a difference in surface color as opposed to a difference in illumination, and vice versa?​[17]​
	Shoemaker’s discussion does not point to any resolution of this problem for his claim that color experience represents surface colors.  In the following three sections I survey some potential responses which are implicit in recent philosophical discussions of color constancy, beginning with a promising way of resisting my reformulated argument from lightness constancy.  For reasons I will make explicit, I do not find these responses fully satisfying.  Whence my skepticism about the idea that achromatic color experiences represent surface colors.  
Note that this skepticism does not extend to our ordinary claims about seeing surface colors.  If the viewing conditions are normal and the cues valid, I see no reason to doubt that we see surface colors.  My argument targets a philosophical account of the nature of achromatic color perception which is committed to the existence of color illusions understood as misrepresentations.  While commonsense acknowledges color illusions, it is neutral on the issue of whether illusions are failures of veridicality.

II
My skeptical argument depends crucially on the idea that the contribution illumination makes to how things look gets lost in the mix, so to speak.  Surface color and degree of illumination both affect how things look, and they do so along the same dimensions of hue, saturation, and lightness.  It seems we are unable to isolate in any clear-cut fashion the specific contributions of surface color and degree of illumination to how things look color-wise.  Accordingly, color vision seems to involve something additional to surface color and degree of illumination, something that is apt to change with a change in the illuminant and with a change in surface color—not to mention a change in surrounding colors
	So far I have taken for granted that the traditional characterization of color space as having three dimensions is adequate for purposes of characterizing the relevant constancy phenomena.  I have been supposing that Peacocke’s two walls with the very same surface color differ from one another in lightness.  The one wall’s higher degree of illumination is having the very same kind of impact on appearance as a lighter paint might have.  David Hilbert (2005) has developed an alternative way of thinking about such cases (see also Jagnow 2009, 2010).   According to his alternative, the two walls are the same in hue, saturation, and lightness, but differ in a further aspect of color appearance.  Call this alleged further dimension of color appearance brightness.  The suggestion is that illumination is not lost in the mix because it makes a distinct contribution to how things look color-wise—it typically affects brightness.  The visual system is able to represent differences in surface color along the familiar dimensions of hue, saturation, and lightness.  Color illusions understood as misrepresentations are possible.
	Hilbert’s proposal requires a departure from the standard way of systematizing color appearances, but the mere fact that it departs from tradition in this way is not worrisome.  There is broad consensus that some aspects of color appearance cannot be straightforwardly accommodated by appeal to the familiar dimensions of hue, saturation, and lightness.  Take, for example, the shiny appearance that glossy surfaces present.  Perhaps the noticeable difference between Peacocke’s two walls is yet another stumbling block for the traditional way of modeling color appearances.  In Peacocke’s example we are dealing with a mild but noticeable difference in degree of illumination on a uniformly colored matte surface, a difference that generates no glare.  According to Hilbert, this visible difference in brightness, like a difference in shininess, is something additional to variations in hue, saturation, and lightness.
	This way of thinking about the effects of illumination is supposed to avoid the consequence that illumination gets lost in the mix, but it looks as though Hilbert’s view has the same kind of consequence.  On this account, perceived variations in hue, saturation, and lightness just are variations in surface color.  Seeing a difference between two surface colors amounts to representing the different locations of these colors in color space (as it is traditionally modeled).  We should not suppose that seeing instances of color always involves representing point-sized locations in color space.  We become increasingly less capable of making precise matches between color samples with decreases in illumination.  Presumably this change in our capacities is due to a representational difference.  Along with decreases in illumination come corresponding increases in the region of color space represented.  The number of determinate colors ruled out by the experience decreases, so color matching becomes more difficult.  As shadows grow deeper, then, we see surface colors less determinately.  And the less determinately we see a surface color, the greater the region of color space represented.  Of course, the color appearance of a surface area does not become similarly less determinate with a decrease in illumination.​[18]​  What becomes less determinate, it seems, is the specific contribution of the surface’s color to the color appearance of the surface.  And now we seem to have returned to our previous claim that the contributions of illumination and reflectance get lost in the mix.
	Hilbert might insist that visual representation of surface color remains as determinate as ever through reductions in the level of illumination.  He might say that our failure to make accurate surface color matches in weaker illumination is due to incorrect representation, not indeterminate representation.  As the lighting conditions become less favorable for making matches in surface color, perhaps our visual states routinely misinform regarding surface colors, e.g. attributing darker colors to objects than they in fact possess.  While this proposal succeeds in addressing the lost-in-the-mix worry, overall it does not seem well motivated.  Decreases in illumination regularly correlate with loss of fine-grained information analogous to what takes place with stimuli in our periphery—loss of information regarding shape, size, orientation, color, etc.  For those inclined to think of visual experience as representational, commitment to indeterminate representation looks unavoidable in these sorts of cases, and there is no obvious reason to treat the case of color as an exception.
My objection to Hilbert’s proposal is hardly decisive.  For all I have said, it may turn out that experimental psychologists are unable to provide an adequate account of lightness constancy without adding further dimensions to traditional color space.  What I want to emphasize is that my skeptical argument rests on a plausible way of thinking about color appearance—a standard one in perceptual psychology.  The jury is still out on whether this standard conception needs to be revised in order to accommodate cases like Peacocke’s two walls.

III
I have been following Shoemaker in supposing that surface color and illumination (i) both regularly affect how surfaces look, and (ii) do so along the same dimensions (hue, saturation, and lightness).  Hilbert agrees with the first point, and disagrees with the second.  Mohan Matthen (2010) adopts a different strategy in response to Shoemaker’s argument from lightness constancy.  He accepts the second point, while raising doubts about the first.  Consider first the darkness brought on by a shadow.  Matthen suggests that this darkness is visually attributed to the shadow itself rather than to the surface.  Cast shadows can have the appearance of voluminous figures on a ground.  A shadow can obscure one’s view of a surface color as one looks through the shadow to the surface.  Similar points can be made about other variations in illumination within a scene.  For example, spotlights sometimes present themselves as voluminous items intervening between the viewer and the colored surface, reducing how visible the surface color is.  The lightness which the spotlight brings forth is visually attributed to the spotlight itself, not to the surface which has been partially concealed by the spotlight.  These phenomenological points suggest that shadows and spotlights are subjects of predication in vision additional to the colored objects we see.  If Matthen is right, the visual system is able to represent differences in surface color via differences visually attributed to surfaces.
	Matthen’s phenomenological considerations seem apt if we are thinking about the stark sorts of lighting conditions that might occur in a medieval castle.  By contrast, my skepticism is motivated by reflection on the subtle variations in illumination that often obtain in mid-century modern homes, which typically have many windows.  Mild shadows and spotlights evidently affect the appearance of the surfaces upon which they are cast.  
Suppose it makes sense to speak of optimal viewing conditions for making matches in surface color.  Imagine you are examining the color of a wall under these conditions when a portion of the surface area you are examining acquires a just-noticeable difference in degree of illumination—it comes to be ever so slightly shaded.  In viewing the slightly shaded area, one is not confronted with a shadow as a figure on a ground.  This mild difference in degree of illumination will affect the appearance of the wall.  For purposes of running my skeptical argument, we do best to focus on mild differences in illumination like this one.
	My intuitions about the phenomenology of shading are hardly idiosyncratic.  Byrne (2001), Chalmers (2006), Hilbert (2005), Noë (2004), Pautz (2009), and Tye (2006) seem to agree that variations in illumination routinely affect the appearance of objects.  Hilbert writes:
Above I described the character of the illuminant as being visually represented.  This is ambiguous as to whether what is represented is a property of the object or a property of the light source.  Do we see how an object is illuminated or do we see the illumination itself?  On phenomenological grounds the first option seems better to me.  What we see as changing with the illumination is an aspect of the object itself, not the light source or the space surrounding the object.
(2005, pp. 150-151)
Hilbert’s remarks here are certainly plausible, and they raise serious doubts about Matthen’s introduction of distinct subjects of predication.
	It is worth mentioning an alternative way to develop Matthen’s idea that the darkness of shadows and lightness of spotlights are visually attributed to something other than colored surfaces.  Gilchrist (2006, p. 193) has suggested that shadows and spotlights can have the appearance of layers distinct from the surfaces they cover.  That is, illumination impacts a distinct visible layer, one that lies atop the colored surface.  And in that case variations in illumination have a distinctive effect on color phenomenology—a different sort of effect from that of changes in surface color or background color, which alter the appearance of the surface itself.  In this way color experience can report specifically on surface color (as opposed to illumination).
	No doubt there is something fitting about the metaphor of layers.  It often happens that a sizeable portion of a scene will be illuminated in just the same manner, making it natural to say of the objects constituting the relevant portion of the scene that they are blanketed with the same sort of illumination.  However, the metaphor of layers is likely to mislead.  An object’s degree of illumination does not literally lie atop the object’s surface!  Degree of illumination is a property of the physical surface just as much as surface color is, and nothing about the phenomenology of lightness perception suggests otherwise.

IV
Yet a further strategy for understanding the output of lightness constancy mechanisms has been developed by Cohen (2008), who resists the idea that the visual system is limited to representing differences in surface color in terms of actual differences in color appearance.  Cohen suggests that color experience also represents counterfactuals concerning how surface areas would appear through changes in illumination and background colors.  We can illustrate the idea by returning to Peacocke’s two walls.  While the two areas appear different, they simultaneously look as though they would present the same appearance under the same illumination.  The visual system goes beyond presenting the occurrent difference in color appearance between the two sections of the wall; it also reports that the sections would look the same were they illuminated in the same way.  The visual system achieves lightness constancy by representing such counterfactuals.  And when constancy breaks down, misrepresentations can occur.  
	Whatever the advantages of this counterfactual approach to constancy, we still have no idea how the visual system manages to represent surface color.  In Peacocke’s example the two regions are in fact different in color appearance, so the visual system must be representing the relevant counterfactuals concerning illumination as counterfactual.  The visual system is reporting that the regions would appear the same if they were illuminated in the same manner.  So the visual system is reporting that the two regions are in fact illuminated differently.  But it is puzzling how the visual system is managing to report this fact if the contribution of illumination to how things look gets lost in the mix.  Introducing the capacity to represent counterfactuals has done nothing to address our original worry.
	A further counterfactual approach has recently been developed by Gert (2010).  Gert’s view is similar to that of Shoemaker in two respects.  First, Gert thinks of the visual system as attributing two distinct features to objects—color appearances and surface colors.  Second, he agrees that we see surface colors in virtue of the color appearances they present.  Gert’s view diverges from Shoemaker’s on the issue of how surface colors are represented visually.  Recall that, for Shoemaker, a difference in color appearance can constitute a representation of a difference in surface color.  Gert is unhappy with the idea that we see actual or counterfactual patterns in color appearance as differences in color.  According to Gert’s alternative, we see colors as the relatively stable, underlying features which help explain actual and counterfactual patterns in color appearance.  Surface colors are visually discernible in virtue of the ways they can and do influence color appearance.
	Ultimately, Gert’s position faces the same worry as Cohen’s.  Consider Gert’s description of cases where the visual system achieves constancy through variations in illumination:
These will be cases in which it appears, perceptually, that two regions share the same pattern of variation with viewing context.  If this is visually apparent, then visual experience will also make it seem as though the two regions would appear the same if they were similarly illuminated. (2010, p. 686)
Visually representing two regions as matching in surface color routinely requires visually representing counterfactuals concerning lighting conditions.  That is, the visual system must be able to represent both how things are illuminated and how they might be.  Gert offers no help in understanding how we might visually represent actual—let alone possible—degrees of illumination.
	It will not help to suggest that degrees of illumination are also represented as underlying causes of patterns among color appearances, that the visual system picks out a given degree of illumination as the underlying cause of a pattern of color appearances through variations in surface colors and other color-critical changes.  In that case visual representation of illumination would presuppose representation of surface color, and could not serve to explain how we represent surface colors.
	The counterfactual approach attempts to illuminate how representation of surface color works by appeal to representation of illumination.  The problem is that this strategy gets us nowhere: it trades one mystery for another.  How the visual system manages to represent degrees of illumination is no less mysterious than how it manages to represent surface colors.  In each case the contribution to color appearance is lost in the mix.

V
At the heart of Shoemaker’s account of color perception we find the following pair of claims:
Existential Thesis.  There are color-related items distinct from surface colors, often referred to as apparent colors or color appearances.
Psychological Thesis.  Visual experience represents surface colors indirectly, by way of these color appearances.
 The case in favor of the Existential Thesis is a powerful one.  But once we get clear about why we ought to take the Existential Thesis seriously, we discover grounds for doubting the Psychological Thesis.  More generally, we find reason to be skeptical of the idea that color experience is representational. 
	There is a simple way to preserve the spirit of the Psychological Thesis.  All we need to do is abandon the claim that color experience represents surface color in favor of something like the following:
Psychological Thesis (revised).  Visual perception of surface colors is indirect, mediated by awareness of color appearances.​[19]​
Previously I attempted to elucidate Shoemaker’s Psychological Thesis by comparing the role of color appearances to the role of paints in the depiction of a scene.  To adapt this analogy to the thesis in its revised form, I need to add that the depiction is ambiguous, typically allowing the viewer to switch between at least two interpretations.  Color appearances are inherently ambiguous items and color experiences inherit this ambiguity: they are non-committal regarding the colors of things.  Perception of color first emerges with a person-level​[20]​ interpretation of color experience and the deployment of concepts like COLOR and SHADOW.​[21]​  The presence of cues often makes one interpretation more natural than another, but not compulsory.  For example, in seeing mild shadows one is able to perform an aspect switch and see a shadowed area as darker because of reflectance rather than weaker illumination.  This way of thinking about achromatic color experience fits naturally with the revised Psychological Thesis: one perceives surface color and illumination in virtue of seeing—and interpreting—color appearances.
Traditionally the idea that color perception involves interpretation has taken the form of a judgmental account of color perception.  It is worth noting, however, that we can embrace an interpretation account without returning to Thomas Reid’s view that color perception reduces to judgment or belief.​[22]​  An interpretation of color appearances is an assignment of meaning to those appearances.  Belief is one attitude you might have towards an interpretation, but it is not the only one.  Compare the case of switching between interpretations of a wire frame Necker cube.  Those who have spent a bit of time with this sort of cube will readily appreciate that there is a distinction to be drawn between visually entertaining an interpretation of what you see and outright endorsing the interpretation.  This distinction between entertaining and endorsing naturally extends to the realm of achromatic color experience.  For example, one can visually switch to an interpretation one judges to be mistaken.  I see no reason to doubt that color perception might at least sometimes be constituted by an interpretation that the subject rejects, so my proposal should be distinguished from a traditional judgmental account of color perception.
We do not need to appeal to aspect switching to illustrate the idea that one can be visually engaged by an interpretation of color appearances short of endorsing that interpretation.  Imagine we devise a variety of displays in which there are noticeable variations in lightness.  The displays differ randomly in whether the differences in lightness are due to a difference in achromatic surface color or to a difference in degree of illumination.  They also differ randomly with respect to cues about illumination: sometimes cues are valid, sometimes invalid (misleading), sometimes absent altogether.  We confront subjects with the displays, informing them about the aforementioned possibilities but not about what they are actually seeing in any given display.  Consider the case where a subject is confronted with a valid cue indicating a difference in surface color.  The subject will naturally form the correct interpretation of the difference in appearance, but she need not endorse that interpretation.  Indeed, she would be rational to suspend judgment in the circumstances.
Although visually entertaining an interpretation does not come to the same thing as endorsing that interpretation,​[23]​ one might follow the lead of Dretske (1990) and suggest that the former amounts to an inclination to believe the interpretation.  This suggestion is dubious, however.  Imagine we devise a display in which there is a variation in lightness but no cues indicating whether the noticeable difference in lightness is due to a variation in the lighting or in surface color.  We confront subjects with the display, asking them to begin by seeing the difference as a difference in degree of illumination and then to switch to seeing the difference as a difference in surface color.  The subjects could, in principle, follow these instructions, performing the relevant aspect switch, without forming any beliefs about whether the perceived difference is a difference in illumination or a difference in surface color and without having any inclination to judge one way or another.  The upshot is that the general approach to color perception I am advocating does not reduce to a judgmental view of color perception.
	I have sketched an alternative to Shoemaker’s account of color perception, one that does away with his claim that color experiences represent surface colors.  In closing I want to address the worry that this alternative is in tension with the argument from lightness constancy.  When psychologists suggest that achromatic color vision affords perception of surface lightness by exploiting luminance ratios, they are typically thinking of lightness constancy as achieved by the visual system via modular, relatively encapsulated mechanisms—not by means of a person-level interpretation.  Endorsement of the interpretation account looks like a denial that lightness constancy, as traditionally conceived, exists.​[24]​  Accordingly, the interpretation account looks to be a poor fit with the argument from lightness constancy.
	This worry is misplaced.  The interpretation account is not intended to account for how we succeed in making reflectance matches so effectively.  No doubt the aforementioned modular mechanisms will figure prominently in any such explanation.  The interpretation account provides a response to a philosophical problem.  We want to know whether visual states themselves classify differences in the image as differences in surface color, and so are susceptible to misrepresentation.  On the view of color perception as interpretation, this sort of classification first emerges at the person-level with deployment of concepts like COLOR and SHADOW.  Only then do we get a representation of surface color, a state susceptible to error.
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^1	  Of course, my conclusion is compatible with the idea that our visual experiences represent properties other than the color-related ones.  Kalderon (2011) and Schwartz (2006) offer different arguments for the same sort of skepticism defended here.  For a defense of the view that color experience is constitutively representational, see Burge 2010.  I respond to Burge’s argumentative strategy in Ganson, Bronner, and Kerr (forthcoming).
^2	  The term “surface color” is meant as a place-holder for whatever it is that is perceived as constant in instances of lightness constancy.  (See below for a detailed discussion of lightness constancy.)  At times it will be convenient to follow Byrne and Hilbert (1997) in supposing that surface color is surface reflectance.  (Since our focus is specifically on lightness constancy, we are talking about achromatic reflectance, the percentage of light a surface reflects.)  The force of my skeptical argument does not depend on this choice to follow Byrne and Hilbert.
^3	  See Shoemaker 1996.  For a response, see Rosenthal 2010.
^4	  This quote comes from Mulligan 1995, p. 182.  Two notes on terminology.  First, I will avoid talk of sensation or visual field throughout.  Second, I will speak of hue, saturation, and lightness (in place of Peacocke’s brightness).  Some authors suggest that we need to add a further dimension to the familiar three dimensions of color space in order to accommodate cases like Peacocke’s example of the two walls.  I will reserve the term “brightness” for this alleged fourth dimension.
^5	  As noted above, Shoemaker appeals to the possibility of spectrum inversion in order to establish the existence of nameless color appearances.  Two subjects might make all the same color discriminations and agree verbally about how to name and describe the colors, and yet their color experiences might be phenomenally inverted relative to one another throughout the spectrally pure colors.  So, for example, what it is like for the one to see a ripe tomato might be just what it is like for the other to see a ripe granny smith apple, and vice versa.  Now, in addition to the subjects’ shared cognition of the colors of things, we need to posit distinctive ways things look or color appearances.
^6	  Our focus here is on experience of color-related properties, but similar points have been made about shape and size constancy (e.g. Millar 2010).  Shoemaker (2006) also posits nameless properties in connection with sense modalities other than vision.
^7	  Nonetheless, one could, with some effort, devise an argument from color constancy that parallels Shoemaker’s argument from lightness color constancy.  I will not attempt to do so here.
^8	  Shoemaker is making a substantive assumption in supposing that these further items are nameless.  A plausible alternative is that our everyday term “color” is ambiguous.  I want to avoid the verbal issue of what is and what is not properly deserving of the name “color.”  
^9	  Helmholtz had thought of lightness constancy as a matter of “discounting the illuminant,” but Katz rightly insisted that “wherever objects are perceived an impression of illumination is always produced” (1935, p. 51).
^10	  When I use the phrase “degree of illumination,” I am not concerned with the absolute level of illumination.  I am referring to a surface area’s degree of illumination relative to surrounding areas.
^11	  In his more recent defense of the claim that we see light whenever we see, O’Shaughnessy (2000) argues from premises not unlike those that figure in Shoemaker’s argument from lightness constancy.  By contrast, in his classic defense of this claim O’Shaughnessy (1984) makes no mention of shadows.  Likewise, when J. J. Gibson (1986) defends the opposing claim that strictly speaking we never see light, he says nothing about shadows.  For recent discussion of the neglected topic of shadows see Casati (2004) and Sorensen (2008).
^12	  For further discussion of background-independent constancy, see Ross and Pessoa (2000) and Gilchrist (2006).
^13	  It is not plausible to think of color appearance as a kind of internal record of luminance values present in the retinal image.  The requisite correlation between luminance values and color appearances simply does not exist.  This point could be illustrated in numerous ways, but I will limit myself to two examples.  We have already noted the effects surrounding colors have on color appearance.  A visual artist attentive to these pervasive effects on how things look is not attending to luminance: the luminance of a surface area does not change with a change in surrounding colors.  No less noteworthy are the effects penumbrae (along with other graded contours) have on color appearance.  An area reflecting light of lesser intensity than surrounding areas will appear lighter than it would otherwise if the contours of that area are graded, as they typically are in the case of shadows (Evans 1959).  (This lightening effect occurs whether the weaker luminance is due to weaker illumination or darker surface color, and it occurs whether or not the area is interpreted by the subject as lying in a shadow.)  The painter confronted with colors in shadows and asked to make matches in lightness will not, it seems, be tracking luminance.  Typically two regions yielding the same luminance will differ in lightness if one lies in shadow and the other does not: the area in shadow will appear lighter thanks to the presence of the penumbra.
^14	  Should we say, with Shoemaker, that reflection on lightness constancy gets us to roughly the same conclusion as reflection on the possibility of spectrum inversion?  On the usual way of characterizing spectrum inversion scenarios, the phenomenal inversion is supposed to have no behavioral manifestations whatsoever.  Insofar as it is divorced in this way from behavior, the phenomenal difference in question does not seem to be a psychological difference.  For it is plausible to think of the psychological as supervening on the behavioral (Molyneux 2009).  By contrast, the argument from lightness constancy is an argument for a distinct psychological kind (i.e. a kind that figures in psychological explanations and predictions).  The notion of color appearance that figures in psychological accounts of lightness constancy is typically glossed by way of the further psychological notions of hue, saturation, and lightness—dimensions of color space.  In the spectrum inversion scenario, subjects will share one and the same color space, operationally defined.  Their experiences will differ in some further, presumably nameless way.
^15	  Shoemaker’s claim that color experience represents color appearance is problematic.  When psychologists talk about the properties represented by our visual states, they have in mind distal stimuli to which our visual states are causally sensitive (Palmer 1999, p. 78), properties like size, shape, surface color, degree of illumination, distance, and motion.  As we have seen, color appearance is something distinct from the stimuli to which achromatic color vision is responsive.  Further, part of the point in speaking of a sensory state as a representation is to mark the fact that the sensory state is informing or reporting and can do so accurately or inaccurately, but the attribution of color appearances to objects is supposed to be uninformative and infallible.	A familiar alternative is the view that color appearance is a mode of presentation.  For this view see Burge 2010, Chalmers 2006, and Thompson 2009.  Burge (2010, p. 412) claims that the non-illusory changes in color appearance through changes in illumination are different modes of presentation of the same shade of color, and he adds: “Often, as in this case, the difference in mode of presentation involves perception of, and as of, other environmental attributes.  For example, one sees the color shade as the same, but one also sees the illumination of the surface as different.”  As it relates specifically to Peacocke’s case of the two walls, Burge’s suggestion seems to come to the same thing as the response of Byrne and Tye discussed above, a response that dispenses with color appearances!  Further, why say that the perception of illumination is a mode of presentation of the surface color rather than that the perception of surface color is a mode of presentation of the illumination?
^16	  For an overview see Gilchrist 2006, pp. 173-187.
^17	  One might think there is an easy way for Shoemaker to preserve the idea that color experience is representational.  He could grant that achromatic color experiences are ill-suited to represent differences in surface color or degree of illumination, and still insist that they represent differences in luminance.  In fact, this is not an easy fix.  Moving to the view that achromatic color experiences represent differences in luminance would involve abandoning the argument from lightness constancy.  This argument depends on the idea that perception of surface color remains stable through various non-illusory changes in color appearance.  Many of these changes in appearance would straightforwardly count as illusory if achromatic color perception is instead directed towards differences in luminance.  (No doubt many will resist the suggestion that color experience represents differences in luminance precisely because it has counterintuitive consequences regarding which experiences count as illusory.)
^18	  One might object that I am begging the question in assuming that there is something which remains relatively determinate in the circumstances.  However, my goal is not to offer a decisive objection to Hilbert.  I am somewhat sympathetic with his view.  My goal is simply to point out a counterintuitive consequence of his view.  It would be counterintuitive to deny that something remains relatively determinate in the circumstances.
^19	  As Allen (2009) notes, Noë (2004) comes close to endorsing this claim at times.
^20	  So far we have been talking about lightness constancy in humans.  The present account can be adapted to non-human animals whose conditioned behavior speaks in favor of attributing lightness constancy, though in some cases it will be more appropriate to speak of creature-level interpretation.
^21	  Proponents of cognitive penetration may wish to call these concept-deploying states experiences.  And in that case some color experiences will be representations.  They will have contents that attribute surfaces colors to objects.  The important issue is not whether concept-deploying interpretations of color appearances deserve the name “experience.”  What is important is whether our visual states attribute surface colors to objects in the absence of the sort of concept deployment involved in recognition.  I am skeptical that they do.
^22	  See Reid 1997, p. 86.  For discussion of Reid’s views on these matters see Ganson 2008.
^23	  Presumably it is only in cognitively sophisticated creatures like us that entertaining and endorsing could come apart.  There is no reason to doubt that the creature-level accomplishment of interpreting an ambiguous sensory state occurs in animals lacking the concept of truth, but it is doubtful that the distinction between entertaining and endorsing an interpretation could have any application to such a creature.  They would come to the same thing.
^24	  It looks like we end up with something like Craven and Foster’s (1992) operational approach to constancy.  Color constancy, on their view, is a matter of person-level interpretation of variable color appearances.  According to Craven and Foster, color constancy is something accomplished by the subject interpreting her unstable color appearances, not by the visual system itself.  This kind of view is explicitly offered as an alternative to traditional conceptions of color constancy.
